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Abstract. In ASIACCS’08, Burmester, Medeiros and Motta proposed an anony-
mous RFID authentication protocol (BMM protocol [2]) that preserves the secu-
rity and privacy properties, and achieves better scalability compared with other
contemporary approaches. We analyze BMM protocol and find that some of se-
curity properties (especial untraceability) are not fulfilled as originally claimed.
We consider a subtle attack, in which an adversary can manipulate the messages
transmitted between a tag and a reader for several continuous protocol runs, and
can successfully trace the tag after these interactions. Our attack works under a
weak adversary model, in which an adversary can eavesdrop, intercept and re-
play the protocol messages, while stronger assumptions such as physically com-
promising of the secret on a tag, are not necessary. Based on our attack, more
advanced attacking strategy can be designed on cracking a whole RFID-enabled
supply chain if BMM protocol is implemented. To counteract such flaw, we im-
prove the BMM protocol so that it maintains all the security and eﬃciency prop-
erties as claimed in [2].
Keywords: RFID, Anonymous, Authentication, Privacy.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has been applied in a range of indus-
tries such as libraries [12], automatic payment [15], animal tracking [15], supply chains
[8] and E-passport [16]. An RFID system generally incorporates three components: tag,
reader and back-end database. Typically, a reader can interrogate with a tag and send
the tag’s information to database for verification. There are two main kinds of tags:
active tags which are battery-powered [14] and passive tags without battery, which are
powered by the electromagnetic field established by the reader’s antenna. As the cost of
active tags is much higher than the passive ones, only passive tags are considered to be
suitable for large-scale applications such as supply chain management.
Privacy and scalability are two important perspectives in RFID protocols. On the
aspect of privacy, if the tag is not managed carefully, the privacy of its carrier will
be inferred by a malicious party. In some cases, the tags can release the information
about an individual’s medication record, banknote’s serial number, culture preference,
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location information, and etc.. In other cases, a company’s sensitive information such
as product price, and supply chain routine can be obtained by the company’s opponent,
which may lead to the financial loss of the company. In all, privacy is one of the most
essential security consideration in RFID system.
Besides the privacy concern, scalability is another important issue in designing an
RFID authentication protocol. RFID users usually have a high requirement of the pro-
ceeding time. In the survey of [4], more than half the people in the investigation consider
eﬃciency of the RFID authentication process quite important, far more important than
those people who consider security important. In [2], Burmester, Medeiros and Motta
(BMM) proposed an RFID authentication protocol with constant key-lookup to balance
the privacy requirement and scalability. To the best of our knowledge, this protocol is
one of the most scalable solutions that preserve privacy as claimed (please see Section
7 for more details about related works). In this paper, we identify the shortcoming in
BMM protocol [2] and propose an improved protocol accordingly. We argue that the
improved protocol provides stronger privacy than the BMM protocol, while the perfor-
mance of the improved protocol is the same as the BMM protocol. Our contributions in
this paper are summarized below:
1. We analyze the BMM-protocol and find a subtle flaw, by which we can break the
privacy property, namely untraceability. Exploiting this flaw, we design an easy-to-
launch attack under a weak adversary model. Under our attack, an adversary can
easily trace a tag in a supply chain party. Thus, one by one, we can trace such a tag
in a whole supply chain if the BMM protocol is implemented.
2. To improve the protocol, we propose an anonymous RFID authentication protocol
that can fulfill all privacy claims of [2], including defense against eavesdropping
attack, spoofing attack, replay attack, de-synchronization attack, tracing attack and
compromising attack.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the notation that
will be used in this paper. In Section 3, we review the BMM protocol. In Section 4, we
elaborate on our attack. In Section 5, an example on cracking the whole supply chain is
presented. Further, in Section 6, we propose the improved protocol and analyze its se-
curity properties. In Section 7, we introduce the related works on RFID authentication.
In Section 8, we conclude the paper.
2 Notation
If A(·, ·, ...) is a randomized algorithm, then y ← A(x1, x2, ...; cn) means that y is as-
signed the unique output of the algorithm A on inputs x1, x2, ... and coins cn. Let g be a
pseudorandom function (PRF) [7]. If S is a set, then s ∈R S indicates that s is chosen
uniformly at random from S . If x1, x2, ... are strings, then x1||x2|| · · · denotes the con-
catenation of them. If x is a string, then |x| denotes its bit length in binary code. Let ε
denote the empty string. If S is a set, then |S | denotes its cardinality (i.e. the number
of elements of S ). If ctr is a counter which starts from n1 and ends with n, then ctr( j)
denotes its jth value, i.e. ctr( j) = n j, where 1  j  . Let IV be an initial vector for
the PRF g.
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3 The BMM Protocol
In this section, we review the BMM protocol, (which is shown in Figure 1).
In the RFID system constructed by BMM protocol, there is a set-up procedure which
initializes the reader and every tag. Then, they will engage in a protocol to identify the
tag. The whole RFID system is described as follows.
Tag Reader
(k, r, q,mode, ctr) D = {k, ri, q, q1i , · · · , qi , i ∈ {old, cur},}
c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R {0, 1}n
If mode = 0 then ps← r
Else
ps← g(k; q||IV ||ctr),
Update ctr
ν0||ν1||ν2 ← g(k; ps||c)
auth← ν1
ps||auth−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If (k, ps)  D then REJECT
Else ν′0||ν′1||ν′2 ← g(k; ps||c)
If ν′1  auth then REJECT
Else con f ← ν′2
con f←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If con f = ν2 then If ps = rcur then rold ← rcur and rcur ← ν′0
If mode = 0 then r ← ν0 Else if ps = rold then rcur ← ν′0
Else Else if ps = q jcur then q← ν′0 and
mode← 0 and q← ν0 {qiold ← qicur}i=1 and
Else mode← 1 {qicur ← g(k; q||IV ||ctr(i))}i=1
Else if ps = q j
old then q← ν′0 and{qicur ← g(k; q||IV ||ctr(i))}i=1
Output ACCEPT
Fig. 1. BMM Protocol
Setup: When creating a new tag T , the system generates a secret key k, a pseudonym
seed q, a one-time pseudonym r, a counter ctr = 1, and a flag mode = 0. Then it
sets up the initial state information of the tag T as the tuple (k, q, r, ctr,mode). The
system also associates the tag T with its identity IDT in the reader’s database by
initiating a tuple (rold, rcur, q1old, · · ·qold, q1cur, · · ·qcur, k, q, IDT ), where rold = rcur =
r and q ji = g(k; ||q||IV ||ctr( j), for i = {old, cur}, and j = 1, · · · .
The BMM Protocol: It runs in three rounds:
Round 1. First, the reader starts the protocol by sending a challenge c to the tag.
Upon receiving c, the tag first checks its mode state: if mode = 0, it sets the
pseudonym ps = r; otherwise, it computes ps = g(k; q||IV ||ctr) and updates the
counter ctr = ctr + 1. Then, the tag calculates ν0||ν1||ν2 = g(k; ps||c). Here, ν0
is used to replace the pseudonym r; auth = ν1 is used to authenticate itself to
the reader, and ν2 is used to authenticate the reader.
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Round 2. The tag sends the message ps||auth to the reader. Upon receiving ps||auth,
the reader requests to its back-end database to look up the tuple (rold, rcur, q1old, · · ·
q
old, q
1
cur, · · ·qcur, k, q0, IDT ) such that ri = ps or q ji = ps, where i = {old, cur}
and j = 1, · · · , through using ps as an index. If the tag is de-synchronized
within  times, we can find the tuple in constant time by 2 + 2 indexes. If the
tuple is found, the reader calculates ν′0||ν′1||ν′2 ← g(k; ps||c) and accepts the tag if
auth = ν′1. Otherwise, the tag is rejected. If a tag is accepted, the reader prepares
a confirmation message con f ← ν′2.
Round 3. The reader sends the confirmation message con f to the tag. The tag
authenticates the reader by checking whether con f = ν2. If the reader is suc-
cessfully authenticated, the tag then updates its pseudonym: if mode = 0, it
updates the pseudonym r = ν0; if mode = 1, it updates pseudonym seed q = ν0
and keep the pseudonym r unchanged. If the reader is not authenticated, the
tag sets mode = 1 and does nothing else. On the reader side, it updates the
tuple (rold, rcur, q1old, · · · , qold, q1cur, · · · qcur, k, q0, IDT ) associated with the tag as
follows. If ps = rcur , it updates rold = rcur and rcur = ν′0. If ps = rold, it only
updates rcur = ν′0. If ps = q
j
old for some j between 1 and , it updates q = ν′0
and q jcur = g(k; ||q||IV ||ctr( j) for j = 1, · · · . If ps = q jcur for some j between 1
and , it updates q = ν′0, q
j
old = q
j
cur and q jcur = g(k; ||q||IV ||ctr( j) for j = 1, · · · .
Burmester, Medeiros and Motta claimed that it can “support anonymity with con-
stant key-lookup cost; however, it suﬀers from entrapment attacks” [2]. To preserve the
privacy of a queried tag, an adversary that eavesdrops over the protocol should not be
able to figure out the identifier of the tag with higher likelihood than a pure random
guess. The same should also apply to an unauthorized reader that attempts to query the
tag. In other words, the protocol should ensure “tag anonymity”, in terms of session
unlinkability: an adversary should not be able to link together two or more protocol
sessions involving the same tag (regardless whether the identity of the tag is known
or not) to track the activities of the tag. To achieve this, any two protocol exchanges
involving the same tag must appear reasonably random such that the adversary cannot
diﬀerentiate it with non-negligible probability from two protocol exchanges involving
two diﬀerent tags.
Unfortunately, there exist some flaws in the updating procedures in the design of
BMM protocol. The flaws can be subsequently exploited to launch a simple attack to
trace a tag in a series of protocol runs.
4 Attacking the BMM Protocol
In this section, we describe a three-run interleave attack and show how to use it to track
a tag. Our attack is easy to launch as it requires a weak adversary model as depicted
below.
4.1 The Adversary Model
In typical RFID security scenarios, adversaries with diﬀerent levels of power are mod-
eled to analyze diﬀerent RFID authentication protocols [10]. We consider adversaries
with three levels of power as follows:
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– Level-1 (Passive attack):
Able to perform passive eavesdropping and intercept messages over legitimate pro-
tocol sessions.
– Level-2 (Active attack with protocol participation & protocol disruption):
Able to communicate with a legitimate tag or reader by following the steps specified
under the protocol and to replay, corrupt, block or inject (replace)messages.
– Level-3 (Active attack with secret compromise):
Able to capture a legitimate tag and extract its secrets through physical layer attack
and side channel attacks.
It is reasonable to assume that a higher level adversary also possesses the abilities of all
levels preceding it, i.e. a level-3 adversary has the abilities of level-1 and level-2 adver-
saries, as well as the set of additional abilities of physical layer attacks and side channel
attacks. As we will be showing in next subsection, our attack requires a relatively weak
adversary model (w.r.t., a level-2 adversary), where an adversary has limited ability to
communicate with a legitimate tag following protocol steps.
Diﬀerent kinds of attacks can achieve variable goals. Eavesdropping attacks can track
a tag successfully if the tag’s responses keep same. Attackers can communicate with
trusted readers and trusted tags through spoofing and replay attack. De-synchronization
attacks can interrupt regular communications between trusted readers and tags through
blocking, modifying and injecting messages. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks mean that
a legitimate reader is flooded with useless messages so that it cannot communicate with
legitimate tags normally.
4.2 Three-Run Interleave Attack
We first give the intuition behind our attack. We observe that the state information (in-
dex) ‘r’ in the tag always keeps unchanged in the protocol executions when mode = 1
and con f = ν2 (see Figure 1). It means that the tag will reply with the same response in
the next interrogation. Our attack follows this observation and uses a ‘three-run inter-
leave’ technique to push the tag into the state of mode = 1 and con f = ν2.
Tag Malicious Reader
(k, r, q,mode = 0, ctr) c ∈R {0, 1}n
c←−−−−−−
ps← r and Update ctr
ν0||ν1||ν2 ← g(k; ps||c)
auth← ν1 ps||auth−−−−−−→ Receive and Store
Send another Random
ν2  c Number c
and mode← 1 c←−−−−−−
Fig. 2. First Run of The Attack
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As mentioned in Section 4.1, we assume a level-2 adversary as the malicious reader,
denoted by RM . We denote a legitimate tag by T and a trusted reader by RT . The attack
consists of three runs, during which T is interrogated by RM twice and by RT once. We
present the attack in detail as follows.
1. First Run: RM interrogates T
This first run of our attack is illustrated in Figure 2. During the first protocol run,
RM interrogates T with an incomplete protocol execution. We assume that RM can
launch attacks after several legitimate communications between RT s and T , so we
can consider the initial status of T as mode = 0. After sending a challenge c, RM
receives the reply message ps||auth = r||ν1 from T . As RM does not share any
secret with T , it cannot compose the correct confirmation message for T . Instead,
RM sends a random value c to T . At the tag’s side, c cannot be verified against
con f , so T changes its status into an attacked state with mode = 1. To this end, RM
stores the reply ‘r||ν1’ and continues to the next step.
Note that if RM sends queries to a tag continuously, he/she can only obtain the
unlinkable information ps||auth. Therefore, to get useful information, which can
link the same tag by comparing ‘r’, the adversary intentionally involves a trusted
reader RT in the second run.
2. Second Run: RT interrogates T
The second run of our attack is shown in Figure 3. During the second protocol run,
T is put forward and interrogated by a trusted reader RT with a complete protocol
execution, while RM does nothing. Note that in the first run of our attack, T toggles
its mode in T to ‘1’; therefore, after T receives the confirmation message from the
legitimate reader, its mode is changed into ‘0’. As now, T only updates q into ν0
but keeps r unchanged.
3. Third Run: RM interrogates T
During the third protocol run, RM interrogates with T again as in the first run for
tracing the same tag T that has been interrogated in the first run. To achieve this,
RM sends the same challenge c to the tag and expects a repeated reply by T . Recall
that in the second run, a successful protocol run between RT and T toggles T to a
secure status mode = 0. Following the protocol, T shall reply with ps||auth = r||ν1,
which is the same authentication information as that in the first run. It is thus easy
for the attacker to trace the tag T by comparing the ps||auth values.
4.3 Discussions
We stress that our attack is practical. There could be a number of ways to launch such
an attack.
Recall that in the first protocol run of our attack, a malicious reader interrogates with
a legitimate tag. We can further reduce this requirement if the adversary has minimum
eavesdropping and blocking capabilities: in the first run, the adversary eavesdrops the
first two protocol messages and blocks the third messages to make the protocol incom-
plete. Thereafter, the tag is triggered into an insecure state and the reader updates the
status for the record of this tag. The attack continues with a successful second run and
an incomplete third run (same as that of the first run). By comparing the eavesdropped
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Tag Legitimate Reader
(k, r, q,mode = 1, ctr) D = {k, ri, q, q1i , · · · , qi ,
i ∈ {old, cur}},
ps← g(k; q||IV ||ctr), c
′
←−−−−−−−−−− c′ ∈R {0, 1}n
Update ctr
ν0||ν1||ν2 ← g(k; ps||c′)
auth← ν1
ps||auth−−−−−−−−−−→ If (k, ps)  D then REJECT
Else ν′0||ν′1||ν′2 ← (k; ps||c′)
If ν′1  auth then REJECT
Else con f ← ν′2
con f←−−−−−−−−−−
If con f = ν2 If ps = q jcur then q← ν′0 and
mode← 0 and q← ν0 {qiold ← qicur}i=1 and{qicur ← g(k; q||IV ||ctr(i))}i=1
Else if ps = q j
old then q← ν′0 and{qicur ← g(k; q||IV ||ctr(i))}i=1
Output ACCEPT
Fig. 3. Step Two of The Attack
messages in the first run and the third run, the adversary can trace the tag. Such an
adversary is more stealthy as no active interrogation between a malicious reader and a
legitimate tag is needed1.
In summary, the attack can be extended, but not limited to the following forms:
  RM  RT  RM 
  RTA  RT  RTA 
  RM  RT  RTA 
  RTA  RT  RM 
Where RTA denotes an adversary’s presence in an interrogation between a trusted reader
and a legitimate tag.
5 Cracking a Whole Supply Chain by Using the Basic Attack
Based on the basic three-run interleave attack, more advanced attacking strategies are
designed to crack an RFID-enabled supply chain that implements the BMM protocol.
1 Note that in the third run, a diﬀerent challenge c′′ could be used by a trusted reader to challenge
the tag. As long as the r value is not updated in the second run, the ps value is still the same
as the one in the first run.
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5.1 Assumptions
We need to make several reasonable assumptions about an RFID-enabled supply chain
before we elaborate on our attacking strategies.
1. Trusted Zone:
We consider a geographically distributed supply chain, in which each party in the
supply chain may receive tagged articles, process these articles, and ship them out.
For simplicity, we consider the area as a trusted zone inside a supply chain party,
and public zone outside. An adversary is not able to interact with a legitimate tag
in a trusted zone, but can interrogate with a tag in the public zone.
2. One-time Authentication:
While tagged articles are being processed by a supply chain party, the authentica-
tion is performed only once (e.g., typically at the entry point of the trusted zone).
This is reasonable as authentication procedure is much more expensive and time-
consuming than identifier scanning procedure. As the area inside a supply chain
party is considered as a trusted domain, indeed no additional authentication is nec-
essary. While multiple scanning for identifying the tags is still allowed to facilitate
other operations (which are not security related). This is to guarantee that only one
successful session of authentication protocol is conducted in a trusted zone so that
once the articles are shipped out to the public zone, the adversary can launch the
tracing attack.
3. Sticky Adversary:
We assume that an adversary may possess multiple readers at multiple locations
or equivalently possess one reader at multiple instant locations. In other words, we
assume an ubiquitous adversary who is able to stick on the targeted articles in the
public zone along a supply chain.
Supply Chain 
Party B
Trusted Zone
Malicious 
reader
Trusted 
reader
Malicious 
reader
Trusted 
reader
Malicious 
reader
Supply Chain 
Party A
Trusted Zone
Public Zone
 
Fig. 4. An Example for Cracking Supply Chain System
With these assumptions, we illustrate how to crack a supply chain system as in
Figure 4, where two supply chain parties are involved. In an attack, the adversary can
setup malicious readers in the public zones near each supply chain party. Furthermore,
two attacking strategies are given below.
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5.2 Attacking Strategies
Case 1: Tracing a Single Tag along Supply Chain
Suppose an adversary targets on a particular article with an RFID tag T . Before it
arrives at supply chain party A, a malicious reader can launch its attack by interrogating
with T and obtaining a ps value (ps = r) specific to this tag. Inside the domain of
party A, T is authenticated once and processed in some other ways. At last, the article
attached with T is shipped out. Once again, a malicious reader scans all outbound
articles and find this particular tag with the pseudonym ps. Following on, the adversary
repeats the attacks at various transportation locations visited by this article. Eventually,
a list of visited sites of the article, [ A⇒ B⇒ C ⇒ D⇒ E ], are recorded, which
enables the total visibility of this article (in the supply chain, which is serious breach of
its privacy). The tracing attack is illustrated in Figure 5.
Case 2: Tracing Multiple Tags and Constructing Supply Chain Map
Suppose an adversary, for the purpose of obtaining commercial secret, targets on a
manufacture who supplies its goods to various distributors, retailers, etc., via complex
supply chain paths. To construct such a map, he/she needs to trace all the goods attached
with tags along their supply chains. As such, the adversary first builds a database for
all the tags scanned immediately after the goods are shipped out. Suppose 100 tags are
being scanned and recorded in the database, as shown in Figure 6. For each record of
the database,
√ (or ×) represents whether the tag is scanned at certain locations or not.
‘ps’ denote the pseudonyms of a tag, for simplicity, |ps| = 32. As long as the adversary
Party A
Party E
Party D
Party C
Party Bps
Tag
ps
ps ps
ps
ps
 
Fig. 5. Tracing A Single Tag along its Supply Chain
Tag ps Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5 · · ·
Tag 1 09310A78
√ √ × × √ · · ·
Tag 2 38901D43 × √ √ √ √ · · ·
... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Tag 100 9A7B2811
√ × √ √ × · · ·
Fig. 6. The Adversary’s Database
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has enough resources to monitor all potential locations via a number of supply chains,
it will finally draw a complete map for all delivery paths.
We assume that there are L possible locations for each tag, and the number of total
tags is N. An attacker only needs to set up a database with size of O(L×N). He/she can
eﬃciently query the information of a tag in polynomial time.
6 Improving the BMM Protocol
We observe that the main reason that the BMM protocol is vulnerable to our three-run
interleave attack is that the pseudonym ‘r’ shared between the legitimate tag and the
trusted reader is not properly updated. Intuitively, we solve the problem by updating the
pseudonym r at both side after the third protocol message is sent even if the mode is 1
for the tag.
6.1 Improved Protocol
Our improved protocol is shown Figure 7. In the first round, our protocol is the same as
the BMM protocol except that we separate the result g(k; ps||c) into four parts ν0, ν1, ν2
and ν3. The new part ν3 is used to update r when the tag’s mode = 1, and other parts are
Tag Reader
(k, r, q,mode, ctr) D = {k, ri, q, q1i , · · · , qi , i ∈ {old, cur},}
c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈R {0, 1}n
If mode = 0 then ps← r
Else
ps← g(k; q||IV ||ctr),
Update ctr
ν0||ν1||ν2||ν3 ← g(k; ps||c)
auth← ν1
ps||auth−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If(k, ps)  D then REJECT
Else ν′0||ν′1||ν′2||ν′3 ← g(k; ps||c)
If ν′1  auth then REJECT
Else con f ← ν′2
con f←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If con f = ν2 then If ps = r then r ← ν′0
If mode = 0 then r ← ν0 Else if ps = q jcur then q← ν′0
Else {qi
old ← qicur}i=1 and r ← ν′3
mode← 0 and {qicur ← g(k; q||IV ||ctr(i))}i=1
q← ν0 and r ← ν3 Else if ps = q jold then q← ν′0 and r ← ν′3
Else mode← 1 {qicur ← g(k; q||IV ||ctr(i))}i=1
Output ACCEPT
Fig. 7. Improved Protocol
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kept the same as those of the original BMM protocol. In the second round, the reader
also needs to divide the result of g(k; ps||c) into four parts ν′0, ν′1, ν′2 and ν′3. Here, ν′3 is
used to update the reader when the received ps = q ji , i ∈ {old, cur}, j = 1, 2 · · · , and
the reader keeps other operations the same as BMM protocol. In the third round, after
receiving the confirmation message in the protocol, we update the status of r at the tag’s
side with r ← ν3 when ‘mode = 1’ holds in the tag. In this round, we also update the
status as described in the boxed parts at the reader in Figure 7. Since the pseudonym ‘r’
is updated whenever the mode is 0 or 1, the response of the tag behaves randomly at
every interrogation. Therefore, our three-run interleave attack is no longer feasible.
6.2 Security Analysis
We analyze the improved protocol regarding some important security properties. The
essential objective of the protocol is to achieve mutual authentication between a reader
and a tag without disclosing the tag’s identity to a third party, and it is based on a classic
challenge-response mechanism. Without the shared secret, no polynomial probabilistic
time (PPT) adversary can generate the authentication messages transferred between the
two parties.
Our improved protocol’s main purpose is to protect the tags’ privacy, which means
to keep tags’ anonymity and untraceablity. Our improved protocol prevents tags from
tracing attack. The meaning of untraceability contains two aspects: 1) The outputs of a
tag in any two sessions are unlinkable, and 2) The outputs of readers are independent
from those of tags. First of all, we analyze the outputs of any two sessions of a tag. For
any two session i and j, i  j of a tag, let ps(i)||auth(i) and ps( j)||auth( j) denote the
output of the session i and j, respectively.
ps =
{
r, mode = 0
g(k; q||IV ||ctr), mode = 1
}
If mode = 0, then ps = r, and r is updated by a PRF g(·) in the tag after every
successful protocol; otherwise, ps = g(k; q||IV ||ctr), the output of PRF g(·). Therefore,
whether ps = r or ps = g(k; q||IV ||ctr), ps(i) and ps( j) are independent as the output of
a PRF are pairwise independent. The latter part of the tags’ output is auth = ν1 which is
a part of g(k; ps||c) (g(·) is a PRF). Therefore, auth(i) and auth( j) are independent and
unlinkable. As a result, ps(i)||auth(i) is independent from ps( j)||auth( j).
Second, we illustrate the output of the reader is independent from the output of a
tag. We consider the output of tag is ps||auth and the output of the reader is con f . ps
is the input of the PRF g(k; ps||c), and con f is the output of PRF g(·). As the input and
output of a PRF are independent, ps is independent from con f . The auth = ν1 is the
second part of the output g(k; ps||c), and con f = ν′2 is the third part of the output of
the PRF g(k; ps||c). Therefore, auth is independent from con f . In all, the output of tag
ps||auth is independent from the output of the reader con f . Thus, the independence of
outputs between diﬀerent sessions of a tag and the independence of outputs between
a reader and a tag guarantee the privacy of tags, and attackers cannot trace a tag by
eavesdropping or active interrogations.
Based on challenge-and-respond technique, mutual authentication, PRF in both tag
and reader, and update processes, Level-2 attacks cannot be applied here, for instance,
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de-synchronization attack. Because the trusted reader keeps not only the newly updated
values, but also the old values corresponding to a former corrupted protocol run, if a tag
is pushed de-synchronized with the legitimate reader by a malicious adversary, it can
still be recognized by referring to the older record qi
old, i = 1, 2, · · · ,N in the database.
By successful mutual authentication, the reader and tag can be re-synchronized again.
As we argue in section 4.1, our improved protocol can prevent level-2 attack, so it
can possess the ability of counteracting weaker attacks. To counteract Level-1 attacks,
for example, eavesdropping attack, an adversary can only obtain the challenge c and
pseudonyms ps||auth and ν′2, which are generated by PRF, but nothing else. Level-1
adversaries cannot link the information together to trace a tag, either. To prevent Level-
2 attackers, the challenge-and-respond technique protects the reader from Denial-of-
Service (Dos) attack. In addition, since fresh random numbers are generated by both the
reader and the tag for mutual authentication and both the tag and the reader update their
states after a successful protocol run, simple spoofing and replay attacks have negligible
success rate. In addition, unlike some tree-based RFID protocol [11], if some tags are
compromised unfortunately, released information will not aﬀect other tags’ secrecy due
to that tags do not share secrets in our protocol.
Nevertheless, the improved protocol does not incur any additional cost with respect
to storage and computation. Therefore, the lightweightness of the BMM protocol is
maintained. As stated in [2], the database stores limited numbers of q ji , when these num-
bers are used up, the BMM protocol suﬀers from an “entrapment attack”. The “entrap-
ment attack” means “the tag is prevented from communicating with authorized readers
and can only be interrogated by the adversary” [2]. In conclusion, as mentioned in
Section 3, the security analysis we conducted is limited to level-1 to level-2 adver-
saries, while level-3 adversary is more powerful and may bring more harmful attacks to
the existing protocol.
7 Related Work
Numerous of papers addressing RFID security and privacy have been published recently
(please refer to [8] for a detailed literature survey). Our concern in this paper is on
RFID reader/tag (mutual) authentication, which has also been rigorously studied in the
literature [3] [5], [6], [9], [11], [13], [17].
A number of RFID authentication protocols based on secure one-way hash functions
have been proposed [18]. In one of the previous works, Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita
(OSK) proposed using of hash chain to update the internal states [13]. The scheme
needs to compute two diﬀerent hash function values, one to update the tag’s secret and
the other one to compute the response that is transmitted to the reader during tag iden-
tification. This method incurs a large overhead at the reader’s side due to the exhaustive
search in the back-end database to identify the tag. To mitigate the high search cost,
Avoine and Oechslin proposed an optimization of the scheme using a time-memory
trade-oﬀ for the computation of OSK hash chains [1]. However, in the later works [5]
and [6], the authors pointed out that the optimized scheme is still vulnerable to tag im-
personation attack and suﬀers from low scalability in the presence of attacks. Dimitriou
in [5] proposed a challenge-response protocol for tag-reader authentication. However, it
is still possible for an adversary to de-synchronize tags , leading to a denial of service.
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Pseudonym Random Function (PRF) has been used in the design of RFID protocols.
In [17], Tsudik proposed YATRAP protocol for RFID authentication. It only needs a
single key and a single pseudorandom function (PRF) in a tag, but it is vulnerable to
de-synchronization and denial of service (DoS) attacks as the timestamps can be manip-
ulated in this protocol. Then, Chatmon, van Le and Burmester’s YATRAP+ and OTRAP
[3] were proposed to address the problem of YATRAP. Their schemes were essentially
designed mainly for privacy-preserving identification of tags without providing reader
authentication.
To reduce protocol overhead, people used tree-structure in RFID protocols. Dim-
itriou proposed a tree-based privacy-preserving RFID identification scheme [6]. In [11],
Molnar, Soppera, and Wagner proposed a tree based scheme with a high scalability of
identifying tags. Under these schemes, each tag stores a group of secret keys that lie
along the path of a key tree from root to leaf layer maintained by the back-end database.
During RFID identification, a tag responds a group of values computed using the group
of secret keys over a random challenge and the reader will use the group of responses to
identify a tag. However, it is diﬃcult to implement key updating because some keys are
shared by diﬀerent tags. Even worse, if one tag’s secret is compromised, it may aﬀect
others and leak their secrets.
Next, we analyze the overhead of typical RFID protocols. Assume there are N tags
in an RFID system. The hash-lock protocol in [18] requires an exhaustive search in the
reader’s database to identify a tag, so the overhead of this protocol is O(N). In the OSK
protocol [13], the reader has to calculate hash values with O(N) complexity. Molnar and
Wagner’s method manages the keys of tags in [12] with a cost of O(log(N)). Although
the cost is already much better than the exhaustive search in other protocols, it is still
non-ignorable when the number of tags increases to unimaginable amount. At this time,
the scalability is a headache of the database’s administrator.
Therefore, we can see even if with the help of hash function, PRF, and tree structure,
it is still a diﬃcult problem to balance the security and scalability. Our improved pro-
tocol not only guarantees nearly all the security properties such that it protects tags
from eavesdropping attacks, spoofing attacks, replay attacks, de-synchronization at-
tacks, tracing attacks and compromising attacks, but also possesses constant key-lookup
time in terms of exact match of an index in a database.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the security and scalability of a newly proposed RFID au-
thentication protocol by Burmester, Medeiros and Motta [2]. We found a subtle flaw in
this protocol. Under a weak adversary model, an attacker can launch a three-run inter-
leave attack to trace and identify a tag. Further on, complex attacking strategies can be
constructed on cracking the whole supply chain using such an authentication protocol.
We improve this protocol by eliminating the flaw in BMM protocol. We provide a secu-
rity analysis on the improved protocol and claim that it meets its security requirements
and that it is as eﬃcient as the original protocol in each invocation.
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